Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

2010

Becky Sue Myers v. Tracy Lynn Myers : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Samuel M. Barker, Jeffrey A. Callister; Smart, Schofield, Shorter, and Lunceford; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Guy L. Black; Greenwood and Black; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Becky Sue Myers v. Tracy Lynn Myers, No. 20100341.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/3040

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
BECKY SUE MYERS,
Appellee,
Supreme Court No. 20100341

vs.
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Samuel M. Barker, No. 6073
Jeffrey A. Callister, No. 9962
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellee
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 747-0647
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049

Guy L. Black, No. 6182
Greenwood & Black
Attorney for Appellant
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4652
Facsimile (801) 37704673

UTAH APPELUTE COURTS

nr.T \ •» 2ND

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
BECKY SUE MYERS,
Appellee,
Supreme Court No. 20100341

vs.
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Samuel M. Barker, No. 6073
Jeffrey A. Callister, No. 9962
Smart, Schofield, Shorter & Lunceford
A Professional Corporation
Attorneys for Appellee
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 747-0647
Facsimile: (801) 747-1049

GuyL. Black, No. 6182
Greenwood & Black
Attorney for Appellant
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone (801) 377-4652
Facsimile (801) 37704673

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND
RULES

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITIONS IN OTHER COURTS

3
3
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

'.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

7

ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONSTRUCTION
AND/OR APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(10)
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY ADDING A THIRD PRONG
TO THE TWO-PRONG TEST FOR COHABITATION ESTABLISHED IN
HADDOW

8

8

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY REMOVING THE BURDENSHIFTING ELEMENT OF COHABITATION ESTABLISHED IN
HADDOW

11

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN
JUDGMENT FOR THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL
COURT REGARDING COMMON RESIDENCY AND SEXUAL
CONTACT

18

CONCLUSION

24

ADDENDUM

25

8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Haddowv. Haddow, 707 P.2d669 (Utah 1985)

....7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16

In re the Marriage of Gibson, 320 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa, 1982)
Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, 173 P.3d 223
Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, 231 P.3d 815

9
1,2,12

2, 3, 8, 9, 10,12, 19, 20,21

Rowlings v. Rowlings, 2010 UT 52

1

Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct.App. 1995)

12

State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978)

22

Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997)

18

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1985)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i)
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(10)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102

2,11
2
1,2,3, 11, 13,16, 17,18
7,12
1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this judgment of the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Section 78A-3-102(3)(a) of the Utah Code, which is by writ of
certiorari under Section 78A-3-102(5), Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and/or application of
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(10). This issue is subdivided into the issues of (a) whether the
court of appeals erred by adding a third prong to the two-prong test for cohabitation
previously established by the Utah Supreme Court under Section 30-3-5(10); and (b)
whether the court of appeals erred by removing the burden-shifting element of
cohabitation inherent in Section 30-3-5(10) previously established by the Utah Supreme
Court. Both of these are legal determinations.
Standard of Review: When reviewing cases pursuant to a writ of certiorari, the
Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district
court. The Utah Supreme Court reviews the court of appeal's legal determinations for
correctness. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, ^f 20.
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in its review of the district court's
factual determinations.
Standard of Review: When reviewing cases pursuant to a writ of certiorari, the
Utah Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals, not that of the district
court. Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2010 UT 52, f 20. Appellate courts defer to a trial court's
factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous. Jensen v. Jensen, 2007

UT App 377, 173 P.3d 223. Therefore, in this case, unless the District Court made
clearly erroneous factual determinations, the court of appeals erred when it failed to
uphold such determinations.
CITATION TO OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS
The court of appeals' decision can be found at Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74,
231P.3d815.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to this
Appeal.
Statutes:
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(3) (1985):

Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall be
terminated upon application of that party establishing that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex unless it is further established by the
person receiving alimony that the relationship or association between them is
without sexual contact.
2.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i):

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
3.

Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5(10):

Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabitating with another person.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a case involving the issue of alimony termination pursuant to Section 303-5(10), Utah Code Annotated, and involves the meaning and method of establishing
"cohabitation."
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS & DISPOSITIONS IN OTHER COURTS
A decree of divorce was entered in this case on June 6, 2006, which awarded
Appellee (hereafter "Ex-Wife") alimony. R. at 187-188. On January 31, 2008, Appellant
(hereafter "Ex-Husband") filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce, seeking to
terminate alimony for Ex-Wife's cohabitation, among other reasons. R. at 92-94. On July
1,2008, a bench trial was held in the Fourth District Court of Utah County, the
Honorable Samuel McVey presiding. R. at 176. After hearing evidence, the Court ruled
from the bench that Ex-Wife had cohabitated, and terminated Ex-Husband's alimony
obligation pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), Utah Code Annotated. The Court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 6, 2008. R. at 191-192. Ex-Wife
appealed the trial court's decision on October 29, 2008. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court in a decision entered April 1, 2010. Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74. ExHusband file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with Utah Supreme Court on April 28,
2010. The Utah Supreme Court granted Certiorari on July 27, 2010.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The parties were divorced on June 6, 2006. R. at 188.

2.

At least as early as October 25,2006, Ex-Wife was living with her parents.
She reported to the court in a criminal case that she resided with her parents
on that date. (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14; Tr. at pp. 76-77; Tr. at p.
116:2-7; Plaintiffs Exhibit l1).

3.

During the same period, M.H. began living in the same house as Ex-Wife.
Tr. at 127:2-4, 132:15.

4.

Ex-Wife was living at her parents' home without paying any rent or other
expenses, which her parents paid for her and M.H. (Tr. at p. 128:9-11; Tr.
atp. 144:11-13).

5.

Ex-Wife's parents were not aware of or able to control the sexual
interactions that were occurring among the residents of their home (Tr. at p.
131-132; Tr. atp. 137).

6.

Ex-Wife and M.H. lived in the same house, with Ex-Wife's, for at least five
months, and possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 17-25; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr.
at p. 116:2-7; Tr. at p. 162:21-25; Affidavit of Misty Myers, received by the
trial court as an Exhibit, and which the parties' counsel stipulated before

1

The trial court apparently lost all of the exhibits, as none of them are part of the record
(although they are referred to as having been marked and received in R. at 169 and in the
trial transcript at various locations). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was a document prepared by
Appellee on October 25, 2006 in connection with a criminal charge against her, in which
she represented to the Court that her residence was 867 North 2600 West, Provo, Utah
84601—the same address as that at which she and M.H. cohabitated.

the court of appeals was part of the lost exhibits below and part of the
record on Appeal, attached hereto as Addendum E,fflf5, 6.
7.

Ex-Wife and M.H. both came and went from the house as they pleased (Tr.
at p. 8; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 11, 12).

8.

Ex-Wife and M.H. slept in the same room together on one or more
occasions (Tr. at pp. 103-104; Affidavit of Bryce Myers, received by the
trial court as an Exhibit, and which the parties' counsel stipulated before
the court of appeals was part of the lost exhibits below and part of the
record on Appeal, attached hereto as Addendum F, ^ 4.

9.

Ex-Wife and M.H. received their mail at that same address, including
alimony payments from Ex-Husband (Tr. at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-7; Tr.
at p. 128:4-8).

10.

Ex-Wife did not provide any rent receipts or other documentary evidence to
show that she or M.H. had any other address at which either of them
resided (Tr. at p. 39:17-22).

11.

Ex-Wife claimed that she did not have any other permanent address except
her parents' address, where she and M.H. resided (Tr. at p. 14:5-10).

12.

Ex-Wife and M.H. were seen coming and going from the house together
(Tr. at pp. 8-9).

13.

Ex-Wife and M.H. had a romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115:3-13;
Addendum E,t 10).

Ex-Wife and M.H. treated each other as boyfiiend dnd girlfriend.
(Addendum F f 4, Tr at p 11 S:3-5; Addendum E, 1j 8).
Ex-Wife and M.H. were inseparable (Addendum I "f
l i ji )« I II! ! I

I

il |i I I >

\ddendum E, | 6).

Ex-Wife and M.H spent the night together in Salt Lake City (It at p
1 H i -9; Addendum h 11LK 11 at p. I I J

\ Addendum 1 fl|| 1 ).

I \ Wff< \ u^lm 1<M\ is il llir house nil U III nl ll\e ditlcienl ou MOIIS when
a private investigator drove by the house (Ir. at p. 9:9-16).
The observations of Ex-Wife's son led him to believe that I" \ Wile and
Jill

u i i I la iiij.* a si. MI il ii lalioii »lnp uld iiiliiiii 1 ]\

s

Ex-Wife and M i l . interacted and behaved in a way that was consistent with
a romantic relationship (Tr. at p 11S, Addendum F f 7
1

10)

'\ ill and M II attended paities to^elhei, at adc In idi\ an I nU I r

thuimh 1he\ were nrlfriend and ho\luend(Ir. at p. 113.3-5; Addendum E,

118).
1 \AVileandMH llnled with each othei (Addendum 1 }\ 1).
r> Wife and I I II Ion III tulh i H li ill) i it linusnnd u led heart-broken
and love-sick during those fights (Addendum F ^| ^ I
Ex-W lie tlevv into a jealous rage when she thougli that M 11 was spending
Innt Mill i lb* i Jiiils and Jit assunndln
109:9-25; Addendum F, ||f 6-7).

i i lu ilim* on I n I I i i |

24.

Ex-Wife admitted to her daughter that she was aware of what would happen
if she and M.H. got caught together (after Ex-Wife's daughter became
aware of certain letters between Ex-Wife and M.H.) (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr.
at p. 123-124; Addendum E, %10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The court of appeals erred by expanding the showing needed to establish
cohabitation. It mandated that trial courts not terminate alimony unless they find certain
factors to exist regarding common residence—factors that the Utah Supreme Court, in
Haddow v. Haddow, ruled were not a necessary requirement to establish common
residence.
The court of appeals also improperly assumed that Utah's legislature, in a 1995
amendment to Section 30-3-5 of the Utah Code, jettisoned the burden shifting
requirement contained in the pre-1995 statute. The legislature did not manifest any such
intent, and a review of the legislative history demonstrates no such intent. It appears
more likely and reasonable to assume that the legislature merely incorporated Haddow's
common-law process for establishing cohabitation by reference, and thereby streamlined
the statutory language, without substantively altering it or its burden-shifting (except to
remove a "homosexual cohabitation" loophole).
Regardless of whether the court of appeals made errors of law, its primary error
was that it failed to give proper deference to the trial courts' factual determinations, and
instead misconstrued the facts in a manner that was least favorable to the trial court's
conclusions of law. The facts shown at trial were sufficient for the trial court to conclude

that i K-Wi l> maintained a common abode with another person for more than a temporary
or short period. The facts shown at trial were also sufficient for the trial court lo
conclude that bx-VViic had a iclativ ely permanent sexual relationship w illi that same
poison

1 IN In ill mill M I fiislilinl in finding lh.il .1 condition of < ohabitation existed

and that alimony should be terminated.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN U S CONS IKIK HON INlMli?
APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(10).
A. THE COUR1 OF APPEALS ERRED BY ADDING A THIRD
PRONG TO THE TWO-PRONG TEST FOR "COHABITATION"
ESTABLISHED IN HADDOW.
In (hiihlow 1 'U/J, 11 II"' I1 M <><>«> 11 l( ill 1 C*1S 1) (hi i 1 mill dt M loped A \\\

prong test for establishing cohabitation. Thai test required that the person seeking to
terminate alimony establish that the other party and her "cohabitant" share a common
abode as then pimeipal lesideiue loi iiioir lluii a leiiipoui\ in Jmrl prnnd
Cohabitation is thus established unless the other part\ thereafter proves that there is not a
relatively permanent sexual relationship (i.e., akin to that existing between a husband and
witel U at ff71
1 In 1 inn) of appeals acknowledged that the aforementioned factors of common
residency and sexual contact are relevant considerations in establishing cohabitation; but
it then added a third test not authorized bv tladdow. Alter acknow lodging that the trial
1 inut had t oii^-itleinl \ omnium icsidntr\ iml sexual 1 ontai 1 llu 1 nuil ol appi .lis nil I
that such analysis was too narrow and that the trial "court must take the next step and

determine whether the parties entered into a relationship 'akin to that generally existing
between husband and wife.'" Myers at ^[17.
While Haddow did use the phrase "akin to that generally existing between
husband and wife," such phrase was used in Haddow to describe the nature of the sexual
contact between the parties, not to describe other aspects of the parties' relationship, such
as their common abode. Haddow said that the parties must have "sexual contact
evidencing a conjugal association," i.e., akin to a husband or wife. Haddow at 672.
Sexual contact must be of a conjugal nature. Common residence or domicile need not be
akin to that existing between a husband and wife.
In Myers, the court of appeals reversed the trial court because the appellate court
determined that the trial court was mistaken in finding that the Ex-Wife and her partner
lived in the same residence. The court of appeals ruled that those parties could not be
found to live in the same residence unless they "shared expenses, shared decisionmaking, shared space, [and] shared meals." Myers at ^ 18.
Haddow, mstead of creating a list of required facts (such as shared expenses,
decisions, space, or meals) to establish common residence, looked at the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether the parties were living in the same abode. For the
Haddow court, common residence could be reduced to the simple question: Did they live
there or not? See Haddow at 674 (citing and quoting In re the Marriage of Gibson, 320
N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa, 1982)).

Rather than giving deference to the trial court's determination of the simple
question of whether the parties lived there or not, the court of appeals sought to impose a
mandatory list of factors that, if not present, would fail to establish a common residence.
Haddow considered whether to impose such specific factors on the trial courts; but
decided against it. For example, Haddow evaluated whether to require a showing of
shared living expenses, sometimes used in other states, to establish cohabitation.
Haddow explicitly rejected the adoption of such requirement. Haddow at 673 (". .. we do
not consider the sharing of the financial obligations surrounding the maintenance of a
household to be a requisite element of cohabitation ...").
In the facts of Myers there was sufficient evidence that Ex-Wife and her
cohabitant resided in the same domicile or abode, despite the fact that the trial court did
not specifically address evidence of the specific factors of shared financial obligations,
meals, etc. But, rather than follow Haddow, and look at the total circumstances to decide
whether Ex-Wife and her cohabitant lived together, the court of appeals added its own
third prong and specifically incorporated into their new third prong the requirement of
finding that the parties shared expenses, meals, decisions, and space. Myers at ^[18.
Thus, the court of appeals chose to reverse the trial court's decision because the trial
court did not find those factors—one of which Haddow expressly excluded as a necessary
finding. Myers decided that the requirements Haddow rejected as necessary, were
necessary.
As the court of appeals erred in mandating that such additional factors are a
necessary part of establishing cohabitation, and the mandatory inclusion of such is

inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's prior decision, the court of appeals' decision
should be reversed, as there was sufficient evidence to establish that Ex-Wife and her
cohabitant shared a common residence.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY REMOVING THE
BURDEN-SHIFTING ELEMENT OF COHABITATION
ESTABLISHED IN HADDOW.
In Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), this court was asked to
determine how "cohabitation" should be established in a divorce case. At that time, this
court did not have an existing standard for establishing cohabitation. It created its own
common-law standard for establishing cohabitation by adopting a two-prong test.2 That
two-prong test placed the initial burden on the party seeking to establish cohabitation to
prove that the other party was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Upon proving

2

The two-prong test converted a statutory method of terminating alimony in Section 303-5(3), Utah Code Annotated (1985) into a common-law method of establishing
cohabitation. This two-prong test, which existed statutorily until 1995, mandated that
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse shall be
terminated upon application of that party establishing that the former spouse is
residing with a person of the opposite sex unless it is further established by the
person receiving alimony that the relationship or association between them is
without any sexual contact.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (1985).
In 1995, the legislature amended the foregoing statute and substituted the
following language, which is now codified at Section 30-3-5(10):
Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon the establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is
cohabitating with another person.

common residency, cohabitation was deemed established unless the cohabitating spouse
proved that such common residency was without sexual contact. Id. at 672.
For the last twenty-five years, Haddow has been Utah law regarding the process of
establishing cohabitation. In numerous cases decided since Haddow, the court of appeals
has upheld Haddow as the proper method to establish cohabitation. See, e.g., Jensen v.
Jensen, 2007 UT App 377,173 P.2d 223 (citing Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 917 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995)).
Then, this year, in the instant case, Myers v. Myers, 2010 UT App 74, the court of
appeals jettisoned part of Haddow's prescribed process. It decided that the burdenshifting process of establishing cohabitation was no longer valid, and substituted a new
requirement that the spouse seeking to terminate alimony prove sexual contact. Id. at ^f
15.
While the court of appeals acknowledged that a 1995 amendment to Section 30-35(10) was presumably an approval of u the gloss" of Haddow—a codification of
Haddow's common-law process for establishing cohabitation, it simultaneously chose to
reject that process, and substituted its own process—a process that substantially increases
the burden of proof on spouses seeking to terminate alimony. Id. at 1 15.
At the heart of the court of appeals mistake was its incorrect assumption that the
amendment enacted by the legislature in 1995 intended to increase the burden of
persuasion on the spouse seeking to terminate alimony, by requiring him to prove sexual
contact. Id. at f 15. A brief review of the legislative history of that amendment does not
justify any such conclusion.

HB 36, the amendment to Section 30-3-5 that was presented at the 1995 General
Session of the Utah Legislature, did not initially propose any change to the alimonytermination provisions (other than renumbering the subsection). See 1995-FL0272/001
(11/30/1994 DRAFT), pages 2 & 4, attached with other legislative history items as
Addendum C.
While the bill was on the house floor, J. Brent Haymond proposed an amendment,
which was added to insert the word "in a long-term permanent relationship," after the
word "residing. See House Floor Amendments to HB 36 of January 23, 1995, attached in
part as Addendum C. This amendment was subsequently removed from the final version
of the bill, an apparent rejection by the legislature of imposing a requirement of showing
a long-term permanent relationship. See Section 30-3-5(10).
Between January 23 and January 26, 1995, an additional amendment was
apparently made that completely removed the requirement of proving sexual contact to
terminate alimony. After this change, the relevant language of the proposed bill read:
"Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates
upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is residing in a
long-term permanent relationship with a person of the opposite sex." See H.B. 36,
version of January 26, 1995, attached in part as Addendum C.
While deciphering some notes and comments on the various legislative history
documents is sometimes difficult, it appears that the foregoing language was the version
that initially passed the House. See H.B 36, version with notation in left margin
regarding passing the house, attached in part as Addendum C.

Subsequently, the Senate presumably considered the matter and passed a version
of the bill, and a conference committee reconciled the final versions from both the House
and Senate. The final version changed the word "residing" to "cohabitating," changed
the words "person of the opposite sex" to "another person," and removed the language
"in a long-term, permanent relationship." In addition, legislative intent language was
added to clarify that the legislature did not intend to condone cohabitation. The result
was passed by both houses on February 28, 1995 and become law without the Governor's
signature. See February 17, 1995 Goldenrod copy of HB 36 with notation in upper righthand corner of page 3, indicating that it was the Conference Committee report of
February 28, pages 3 & 4a, attached in part as Addendum C. See also, House Journal of
February 28, 1995, pages 909-910 and Senate Journal of February 28, 1995, pages 868870, attached as Addendum C.
From this legislative history, the bill that originally passed by the House did not
intend to require the payor spouse to prove any sexual contact to terminate alimony. The
payor spouse needed only to prove the element of residence.
Contrary to the court of appeals' presumption, it does not appear from the
legislative history that there was any intention to place the burden of proving sexual
contact on the payor spouse. In fact, a fair reading of the amendment may be that the
legislature intended to completely discard sexual contact as a required factor to terminate
alimony.
Further evidence supporting this conclusion comes from a Memorandum prepared
by the Office of Legislative Research & General Counsel, dated October 21, 1992, which

was prepared to advise Members of a divorce task force regarding changes to alimony
law. This memorandum is among the materials included in the legislative history
documents on file for HB 36, and is attached as part of Addendum C.
Legislative Research's memorandum, which legislators presumably relied on in
deciding how to proceed with the amendment, distinguished "cohabitation" from "sexual
contact," mistakenly treating them as two separate tests. For example, Legislative
Research stated, in part, under the heading "Sexual Contact and Cohabitation as Grounds
for Termination" on page 4 of the Memo: "Currently, several states terminate alimony
based on cohabitation and sexual contact with a person of the opposite sex." Addendum
C. After reading the memorandum, the average legislator could not help but assume that
cohabitation did not require sexual contact—that they were two separate and distinct
elements. In the memorandum, "cohabitating" was essentially equated with "residing,"
and "sexual contact" was a distinct factor from "cohabitating." If legislators relied on
that distinction, then they arguably intended to jettison any requirement for proving
sexual contact when they removed sexual contact as a requirement from the statute. The
change of the word "residing" to "cohabitating" is easily explained as a response to
General Counsel's mistaken implication that "cohabitating" meant "residing."
Another possible explanation is that the Conference Committee recognized that
removing sexual contact as an element of cohabitation (thereby leaving "residence" as the
only test), as stated in the House's version of the bill, would, without some additional
test, result in alimony termination in all cases unless the payee spouse lived alone.

Surely, the legislature did not intend to terminate alimony for a payee merely because she
was living in a platonic relationship with a relative.
It seems likely that more intelligent members of the Conference Committee may
had recognized the problem, and being aware of Haddow's common-law process for
establishing cohabitation, simply incorporated Haddow's process and standards for
establishing and terminating alimony into the statute by substituting the word
"cohabiting" for "residing."
The result left alimony termination law essentially unchanged, except to close a
"homosexual cohabitation" loophole by extending the cohabitation statute to cover
cohabitation with persons of both sexes, rather than just the opposite sex.
Legislators, who never defined "cohabiting" in their 1995 amendment, should
have understood that the common law definition of "cohabitation" in Utah was developed
by Haddow'§ reference to the pre-1995 version of Section 30-3-5(10). Because Haddow
defined "cohabitation" by reference to the pre-1995 version, the legislature should have
understood that by inserting the word "cohabiting" they would essentially codify
Haddow. Under Haddow, "cohabitation" was the equivalent of the standards outlined in
the pre-1995 statute, including its burden-shifting process. As they were equivalent, the
1995 amendment arguably kept the same standard and process for alimony termination,
but used fewer words to do so.
Furthermore, substantial issues of fairness and good public policy support an
ongoing process of requiring the payor spouse to show a common residence, and then
shifting the burden to require the payee spouse to show lack of a sexual relationship.

While the process of obtaining evidence needed to show a common residence is
achievable (e.g., through surveillance of the residence, receipt of mail, address listings in
directories, etc.), in most cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the payor to show the
existence of a sexual relationship between the payee and a cohabitant.
By its very nature, sexual contact is private and hidden, and cannot normally be
discovered unless admitted by one of the persons who engaged in the sexual act. If the
payee commits perjury about the sexual relationship (and in alimony cases she has strong
financial incentives to lie, and thereby keep the money flowing), then there is little hope
of ever proving that sexual contact occurred.
In some cases, it is possible that the payee's cohabitant may be persuaded to tell
the truth about the sexual contact; but if the cohabitant and the payee continue to
maintain a cohabitant relationship, the cohabitant's interests will be closely aligned with
the payee (both financially and emotionally), and an admission is unlikely.
In short, if the burden-shifting part of the process is eliminated, then most payees
will be able to cohabitate with impunity, and will continue to extract alimony payments
because the payor will not be able to establish sexual contact. The resulting system will
encourage deceptive cohabitation and discourage marriage, as payees will live with their
boyfriends in hidden sexual relationships to collect alimony (rather than marry and have
alimony automatically terminate). The discouragement of marriage is certainly not a
policy that the legislature intended, as evidenced by the legislative intent statement
attached to the 1995 amendment to Section 30-3-5(10) (which implied condemnation of

cohabitation by explicitly clarifying that the legislature did not condone such
relationships). Addendum D.
In summary, the court of appeals was mistaken in jettisoning the burden shifting
requirement established in Haddow and the pre-1995 version of Section 30-3-5(10).
Legislative history and legislative intent show that Section 30-3-5(10) was amended to
close a homosexual loophole, not to make any substantive change to the burden-shifting
process of establishing cohabitation. And sound public policy reasons of promoting
marriage and discouraging cohabitation, including those voiced by the legislature in
amending Section 30-3-5(10), support an interpretation of the statute that is consistent
with an ongoing burden-shifting process.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY SUBSTITUTING ITS OWN
JUDGEMENT FOR THE FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL
COURT REGARDING COMMON RESIDENCY AND SEXUAL
CONTACT.
"In certain instances, the appellate court may exercise equitable powers and take

upon itself the responsibility of weighing the evidence and making its ownfindingsof
fact. However, this exception must not become merely a guise under which an appellate
court substitutes its own judgment for that of the trial court. The appellate court must
have a valid reason to take this extraordinary step and then only when the appellate court
is in an equal position with the trial court with respect to the facts and evidence at issue."
Willeyv. Willey, 951 Y2&22^ 231 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted).
In this instant case, the court of appeals weighed the evidence itself, and
substituted its own factual findings and judgment for the trial court's factual

determinations; but it did so without the benefit of being able to judge the demeanor and
credibility of the witnesses. The court of appeals was not in an equal position with the
trial court to judge the facts and evidence at issue. It could not see the expressions of the
witnesses as they testified; it could not hear their voices or observe their body language.
Instead, it was limited to the cold, unemotional, typewritten record—a poor substitute for
the multi-level communication that occurs in courtrooms.
Instead of viewing the facts presented at trial in a light most favorable to the trial
judge's ruling, the court of appeals' decision distorted those facts to present them in a
light most favorable to its own decision and most adverse to the trial court's findings.
For example, the court of appeals found that there was no evidence that Ex-wife
and her boyfriend, M.H., shared the same space or established a common household.
Myers at f 18. To the contrary, the record shows that Ex-Wife and M.H. lived in the same
house for at least five months, and possibly longer (Tr. at p. 13, lines 17-25; Tr. at p.
115:3-5; Addendum E,fflf5, 6), slept in the same room together (Tr. at pp. 103-104;
Addendum F, f 4), received their mail at that same address, including alimony payments
(Tr. at p. 14:2-4; Tr. at p. 40:5-7), did not provide any rent receipts or other documentary
evidence to show that they had any other address at which either of them resided (Tr. at
p. 39:17-22), claimed that they did not have any other permanent address (Tr. at p. 14:510), were inseparable (Addendum F, \ 7; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Addendum
E, 16), were seen coming and going from the house together (Tr. at pp. 8-9), had a
romantic relationship (Tr. at p. 115; Addendum E, f 10), treated each other as boyfriend
and girlfriend (Addendum F, \ 4; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 8), and continued to

see each other and spent the night together even after M.H. left the common residence
(Tr. at p. 112:1-9; Addendum F, % 9; Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f 13). In addition,
Ex-Wife reported to the court in a criminal matter that she resided at the same address
where M.H. resided at least as early as October 25, 2006 (Tr. at p. 13; Tr. at p. 48:10-14;
Tr. at pp. 76-77; Plaintiffs Exhibit l3).
As another example, the court of appeals found there was no evidence that ExWife and M.H. shared meals. Id. While there was sufficient evidence that established
the existence of a common residence without taking testimony on shared meals, the trial
court could have reasonably inferred that Ex-Wife and M.H. shared meals from the
undisputed fact that Ex-Wife and M.H. were inseparable. (Addendum F, % 7; Tr. at p.
115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Addendum E, \ 6). The court of appeals should have given
the trial judge the benefit of that inference.
The court of appeals also found that Ex-Wife and her boyfriend, M.H., did not
share living expenses—and viewed this fact as an important factor in showing a lack of
common residence. Id. Again, there was sufficient evidence to establish the existence of
a common residence without taking testimony on whether Ex-Wife and her boyfriend
shared living expenses.
3

The trial court has apparently lost all of the exhibits in this case, as none of them are
part of the record (although they are referred to as having been marked and received in R.
at 169 and in the trial transcript at various locations). Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 was a
document prepared by Appellant on October 25, 2006 in connection with a criminal
charge against her, in which she represented to the Court that her residence was 867
North 2600 West, Provo, Utah 84601—the same address as that at which she and M.H.
cohabitated.

The fact that Ex-Wife and her boyfriend did not share living expenses, while true,
does not paint an accurate picture of the circumstances of this case. Ex-Wife and her
boyfriend did not have living expenses to share because the undisputed evidence was that
Ex-Wife's parents paid all of those living expenses. (See Tr. at p. 15:19-21; Tr. at p.
128:9-11; Tr. at p. 144:11-13). As there were no living expenses to share, then whether
they shared those non-existent expenses was irrelevant, and not a factor that should have
had a bearing on the issue of common residence or cohabitation.4
The court of appeals also improperly minimized and discounted the sexual nature
of the relationship between Ex-Wife and M.H. While the court of appeals acknowledged
that there was a sexual relationship, it attempted minimized the extent of that sexual
relationship. Instead of giving deference to the trial judge and his view of the evidence,
the court of appeals preferred to emphasize evidence that the trial judge did not believe.
For example, the court of appeals pointed out the equivocation in the testimony
from Ex-Wife's son and the denials of sexual contact made by Ex-Wife. Myers atfflf6,
18. In so doing, the court of appeals chose the evidence it liked, and failed to give due
deference to the evidence the fact finder believed.
Unlike the trial judge, the court of appeals was not in a position to evaluate
witness credibility. It did not witness Ex-Wife shifting nervously on the witness stand as
4

If the Court of Appeals' decision to require the sharing of living expenses to establish
common residence is allowed to stand, it is easy to imagine future cases where exspouses and their cohabitants will simply restructure theirfinancesto avoid any sharing
of living expenses (e.g., by arranging for a sympathetic parent to pay for those expenses),
and through suchfraudulentdeception, avoid alimony termination—thus rewarding
deceptive behavior (which is already too common in alimony termination cases).

she engaged in obvious deception regarding the nature of her relationship to M.H.; it did
not witness the angry glares Ex-Wife shot at her son, and the comments she made as her
adult son began to testify regarding the relationship between Ex-Wife and M.H.—glares
and comments that had an obvious impact on the son, who began to change his testimony
from his earlier affidavit (the impact of Ex-Wife's behavior on her son was so obvious
that the trial judge stopped the proceedings temporarily, cautioned Ex-Wife to stop, and
then cautioned the son to start telling the truth). Tr. at p. 102:13-103:19. All of those
facts had an impact on the trial judge's determination of the nature of the sexual
relationship and the credibility of Ex-Wife's denials.
In short, while it is true that the evidence of the nature of the sexual relationship
between Ex-Wife and M.H. was circumstantial and indirect, the trial court was in a better
position than the court of appeals to judge whether it was more likely than not that ExWife and M.H. were maintaining a relatively permanent sexual relationship akin to that
existing between a husband and wife. It did not need an admission by Ex-Wife that she
was engaged in such permanent relationship to so find. Instead, it could infer that
relationship from the totality of the circumstances, including the circumstantial evidence
of sexual contact, and the behavior and demeanor of the witnesses at trial.
It is a well-established principle of Utah law that circumstantial evidence is a
sufficient basis for a fact finder to make a factual determination, even without direct
evidence. E.g., State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 1978) (upholding a manslaughter
conviction on circumstantial evidence, when there was no direct evidence of the
defendant's actions, except the defendant's own self-exculpatory story).

In this case, there was substantial circumstantial evidence demonstrating the
sexual nature of the relationship. In addition to the issues of credibility apparent only to
the trial judge, such evidence includes that Ex-Wife and M.H. spent the night together in
Salt Lake (Tr. at p. 112:1-9; Addendum F, f 9), that the observations of Ex-Wife's own
son led him to believe that Ex-Wife and M.H. were having a sexual relationship
(Addendum F,13), that Ex-Wife and M.H. slept in the same room together (Addendum
F, 14); that their relationship was romantic in nature (Tr. at p. 115; Addendum E, f 3),
that they were inseparable (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Tr. at p. 118:8-15; Addendum E, f 6), that
they interacted and behaved in a way that was consistent with a romantic relationship (Tr.
at p. 115; Addendum E, %% 7,10), that they attend parties together and sat side by side
and acted as though they were girlfriend and boyfriend (Tr. at p. 115:3-5; Addendum E, f
8), that they flirted with each other (Addendum F, f 4), that they fought with each other
at times and acted heart-broken and love-sick during those fights (Addendum F, | 5),
that Ex-Wife flew into a jealous rage when she thought that M.H. was spending time with
other girls, and she assumed he was cheating on her (Tr. at p. 109:9-25; Addendum F, f f
6-7); and that Ex-Wife admitted to her daughter that she was aware of what would
happen if she and M.H. were caught together (after the daughter discovered letters
between Ex-Wife and M.H.) (Tr. at p. 123-124; Addendum F, f 10).
In short, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which the court
could find the requisite elements of sexual contact and common residency necessary to
terminate alimony. The court of appeals should have given deference to the trial court's
factual determinations on those issues.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully submits that the Court of Appeal's
decision should be reversed, and the trial court's decision to terminate alimony should be
affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jj£ day of GOr&&>£&~
GREENWOOD & BLACK

GUY L. BLACK
Attorney for Appellant
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VOROS, Judge:
^1
Petitioner Becky Sue Myers (Wife) appeals uhe rriel court's
order :ernmating alimony on uhe ground "chat: she v/as cohaDitatmg
m her parents1 nome with her parents1 teenage foster son. We
re/erse.
BACKGROUND
^2
Tracy Lynn Myers (Husband) and Wife were divorced m June
2 0 06, after eighteen years of marriage. Wife was awarded
alimony. In the months following the divorce, Wife "never had a
permanent home," but "bounced all over the place." She stayed
with friends, with her daughters, and with her parents at their
home in Provo, Utah.
1|3
Her parents' house had three bedrooms, one of which they
occupied. The other two bedrooms were occupied by as many as six
foster boys, including M.H. Grandchildren, great-grandchildren,
and "ex-foster boys" also slept over from time to time.

%4
When Wife stayed with her parents, she slept on a couch in
the basement. She also received mail at her parents' address.
Wife's family members testified that she never lived there, but
would sleep over intermittently, "maybe once a month." But a
private investigator hired by Husband observed Wife's car at her
parents' house four out of the five days he drove past m June
2 007, including at least one time early m uhe morning. Based on
this information, the trial court found "the most credible and
persuasive evidence" to be that Wife "spent at least 80% of her
nights" at her parents' home, and that it was, m fact, her
residence m the spring and summer of 2007.
^5
At the heart of this dispute is Wife's relationship with
M.H. The trial court heard no direct evidence that Wife and M.H.
had a sexual relationship. Wife testified that they did not.
Husband acknowledged that he had no personal knowledge of a
sexual relationship between Wife and M.H. Neither party called
M.H. to testify.
%6
Several witnesses described Wife's relationship with M.H.
The parties' son (Son) swore in an affidavit that he "d[id] not
have any doubt" that his mother was having a sexual relationship
with M.H., that M.H. spoke of Wife "as his girlfriend," that they
"flirt [ed] with each other all the time," that he once saw Wife
pretending to be asleep on the couch wnile M.H. lay on the floor
next to the couch, that Wife acted jealous when "she thought
[M.H.] was hanging out \Mth girls," and that he had seen M.H.
acting "like a heart-broken, love-sick boy." Son also stated
that Wife once borrowed his car so that she could visit M.H.
after M.H. had moved to Salt Lake City. But at trial, Son
equivocated on most of these points, admitting that he had
"probably not" read his affidavit before signing it and
acknowledging that he had no proof of a sexual relationship.
%7
The parties' daughter (Daughter) also testified. Daughter s
affidavit stated that M.H and Wife " [were] always together
whenever I [saw] them. " She stated that she began to think there
was a romantic relationship between Wife and M.H. when Wife asked
her to get out of the passenger seat of her car so that M.H.
could sit there. Daughter also observed them at a family party
sitting "side by side, . . . treating each other as though they
were boyfriend and girlfriend," and then leaving together. At
trial, Daughter confirmed many of the statements m her affidavit
and testified that she believed Wife and M.H. had a romantic
relationship because they fought like lovers rather than friends.
f8
Based on this and other
that Husband had established
residency." The trial court
this showing, "the burden of

evidence, the trial court concluded
that Wife and M.H. shared "a common
then ruled that, Husband having made
proving a lack of sexual contact

shifts to [Wife],M and that Wife nhas not met her burden to
establish lack of sexual contact." On the contrary, the court
"believefd] that the most credible evidence before the [c]ourt
indicate[d] that [Wife and M.H.] had a sexual relationship."
%9
Having found thai: Wife and M.H. shared a common residence
and had a sexual relationship, the trial court concluded it had
"no wiggle room to look at equities, to look at fairness or
anything like that," but "must find that under the Utah Code
Annotated as amended m 1995 that a condition of cohabitation did
exist." Accordingly, the court terminated alimony effective
January 31, 2 0 08." Wife appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1[l0 The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred in
concluding that: Wife was cohabitatmg and, consequently, m
terminating alimony. "Whether cohabitation exists 'is a mixed
question of fact and law. While we defer to the trial court's
factual findings unless they are shown to be clearly erroneous,
we review its ultimate conclusion for correctness.'"
Jensen v.
Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, f 2, 173 P.3d 223 (quoting Pendleton v.
Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
ANALYSIS
il 11 Utah Code section 30-3-5 lists seven facuors a court "shall
consider" m determining alimony. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (a)
(2007).z All but one peruain to financial considerations*
(I) the financial conditior ana needs of tne
recipient: spoase,
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or
ability to produce income;
(in) the ability of the payor spouse to
provide support;
(iv) the length of the marriage;
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody
of minor children requiring support;
1.
The trial court noted that Husband had not otherwise
established a change m circumstances that would have "resulted
m a termination of alimony based on financial consideration."
2. The relevant portions of the Utah Code have not changed since
the divorce. Except as otherwise noted, we cite to the current
version for the reader's convenience.

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a
business owned or operated by the payor
spouse; and
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly
contributed to any increase in the payor
spouse's skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or allowing the
payor spouse to attend school during the
marriage.
Id. In contrast to these mandatory considerations, "the fault of
the parties" is at most a factor that the court "may consider" in
determining alimony.3 Id. § 30-3-5(8) (b).
1f 12 This statutory scheme makes clear that the principal purpose
of alimony is economic, "'to enable the receiving spouse to
maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from becoming a
public charge.MI Ostermiller v. Ostermiiler, 2008 UT App 249,
1f 3, 190 P. 3d 13 (quoting Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 100
(Utah 1986) ) aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
2010 UT 43/ see also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (d) ("The court
may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the
parties' respective standards of living.").
"'Alimony is not
intended as a penalty against the husband nor a reward to the
wife.'" English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411 (Utah 1977)
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 Nelson Divorce and Annulment § 14.06
11-12 (2d Ed. 1961 Rev. Vol.)).

3. The status of this factor is unclear. In Riley v. Riley,
2006 UT App 214, 138 P.3d 84, a panel of this court held that a
husband's "extramarital affairs and . . . prolonged deceitful
conduct . . . present[ed] precisely the type of situation where
the legislature intended the trial court to consider fault" and
his "fault [went] a long way in explaining the propriety" of an
alimony award that "would be too high if only economic factors
were considered." Id. f 23. Three years later, in Mark v. Mark,
2009 UT App 374, 223 P.3d 476, a divided panel of this court,
without purporting to overrule Riley, held that "until the
legislature clearly defines fault in the statute, it is
inappropriate to attach any consequence to the consideration of
fault when making an alimony award." Id. f 20. As the point is
not essential to the resolution of the case at bar, we leave for
another day the task of resolving this apparent "evolution of two
conflicting interpretations of the same legal doctrine by
different panels of judges." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,
1269 (Utah 1993).

tl3 Unless a divorce decree provides otherwise, alimony
"automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death" of the
recipient spouse. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(9). The recipient
spouse cannot evade this result by merely cohabitatmg with
anotner rather than remarrying: "Any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse
is cohabiiatmg with another person." Id. § 30-3-5(10).
However, this statutory provision has spoken m terms of
cohabitation only since 1995. Its predecessor statute divided
the concept into (1) residing with a person of the opposite sex,
and (2) sexual contact. See id. § 30-3-5(6) (1995). It also
split the burden of persuasion; proof of common residency shifted
the burden to the recipient spouse to disprove sexual contact:
Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony
that the former spouse is residing with a
person of the opposite sex. However, if it
is further established by the person
receiving alimony that that relationship or
association is without any sexual contact,
payment of alimony shall resume.
Id.
H14 In Kaddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), our supreme
court interpreted this subsection to refer to cohabitation, which
m this context means "'to live together as nusband and vife.'"
Id. at 671 (quoting Black's h3v^ Dictionary 236 (5tn ed. 1979) ;
Webster's N:n:.^ New Collegiate Dictionary 25^ (1984)) .' Thus,
the court construed the first statutory factor--residing with a
person of the opposite sex--to mean "tne sharing of a common
abode that ooth parties consider their principal domicile for
more than a temporary or brief period of time." Id. at 672. The
court construed the second statutory factor--sexual contact--to
4. One term may have different meanings m different statutory
contexts. Thus, as used in the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the term
"cohabitant" includes many categories of persons who do not live
together as husband and wife. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-7-102(2)
(2008). This court has previously stated that it sees m this
broader definition "no legislative intent to abrogate the case
law defining cohabitation m the alimony-termination context."
Hill v. Hill, 968 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). It is
simply the case that "the supreme court has adopted a narrower
definition m the alimony-termination context than the
Legislature has m the cohabitant-abuse context." Id.

mean "participation m a relatively permanent sexual relationship
akin to that generally existing between husband and wife." Id.
It thus concluded that "rcohabitation' means to dwell together in
a common residence and to participate m sexual contact that
evidences a larger conjugal relationship." Id. at 674. This
court has consistently applied this two-part test. See, e.g.,
Pendleton v. Pendleton, 918 P.2d 159, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
Sigq v. Siqcr, 905 P.2d 908, 917-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
f15 The legislature evidently approved the gloss Haddow placed
on the subsection. In 1995, it abandoned any reference to the
separate factors of common residency and sexual contact m favor
of Haddow}s focus on cohabitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-35(8) (Supp. 1996). Jettisoned with the two factors was the
shifting burden of persuasion; since 1995, the spouse seeking to
terminate alimony bears the burden to establish cohabitation.
See id. Even after this amendment, however, our cases have
continued to see the related concepts of common residency and
sexual contact as key m determining whether a couple is m fact
cohabitatmg. See, e.g., Jensen v. Jensen, 2007 UT App 377, % 2,
173 P.3d 223 (citing Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917). Factors bearing on
this question include whether the parties have keys to a single
house, see Pendleton, 918 P.2d at 161, keep uheir belongings m
one home, see Sigg, 905 P.2d at 918, share meals and food
expenses, see id., and share living expenses or assets, see
Haddow, 707 P.2d at 671.
fl6 Making cohabitation the standard for terminating alimony is
consistent with alimony's purpose of enabling "the receiving
spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the spouse from
becoming a public charge." Qstermiller, 2008 UT App 249, ^| 3
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gayet v. Gavet, 456
A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. 1983) (" [Tnere is] a policy to end alimony
when the supported spouse forms a new bond that eliminates the
prior dependency as a matter of law.'1) . Just as the award of
alimony "is not intended as a penalty against the husband,"
English, 565 P.2d at 411, neither is the termination of alimony
intended as a penalty against the wife.
If 17 In light of the foregoing legal principles, we conclude that
the trial court took an unduly narrow view of cohabitation. As
noted above, while common residency and sexual contact are
certainly key to the question of whether two people have formed a
relationship resembling a marriage--most married couples do live
together and have at least occasional sexual contact--the inquiry
does not end there. A court must take the next step and
determine whether the parties entered into a relationship "akin

to that generally existing between husband ano. wi f e . "-' Haddow,
707 P.2d at 672 .
^ilS Wife and M.H. clearly did not have such a relationship. In
the late spring and summer of 2007, Wife spent 80% of her nights
at her parents' home. Her stay there overlapped with M.H.'s stay
as a foster child. But he shared an upstairs bedroom with one or
more male roommates while she slept on a couch m the basement.
They were romantically involved, were "paired up11 at social
events, and apparently shared a furtive sexual relationship.6
They treated each other as boyfriend and girlfriend. But they
did not establish a common household; we have no evidence of
shared expenses, shared decision-making, shared space, or shared
meals. Nor did they maintain n a relatively permanent sexual
relationship akin to that generally existing between husband and
wife." Id. at 672. Whatever Wife and M.H.'s relationship was,
it bore little resemblance to a marriage. Accordingly, they were
not cohabitating for purposes of section 30-3-5(10) . Terminating
alimony on this ground was error.
CONCLUSION
^fl9 The trial court erred in concluding that Wife was
cohabitating. Although Wife and M.H. sometimes slept under the
same roof and may have been sexually involved, their relationship
did not rise to the level of a relationship akin to that of
husband and wife. Accordingly, terminating alimony on this
5. Cohabitation is not the same as so-called common law
marriage. While cohabitation is one requirement of a valid but
unsolemn!zed marriage, there are others. For example, the couple
must "hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform and
general reputation as husband and wife." Utah Code Ann. § 30-14.5 (2007).
6. We note that the trial court erred in ruling that once
Husband proved common residency the burden of proving the absence
of sexual contact shifted to Wife. As explained above, while the
pre-1995 statute included this kind of burden-shifting mechanism,
the current statute does not. It places the burden of proving
cohabitation on the party seeking to terminate alimony. We also
note that the evidence on this point was sufficiently tenuous
that the placement of the burden might have been dispositive
below. It is not, however, dispositive on appeal. Even assuming
for purposes of our analysis that Wife and M.H. were having
sexual contact, they were not living together in a manner akin to
husband and wife, and thus were not cohabitating for purposes of
section 30-3-5 (10) .

ground was error. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

1f2 0

WE CONCUR:

Carolyft-'B. McHugh,
£>
Associate Presiding Judge

Gregorv^^v/'^OrTne, Judge
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BECKY SUE MYERS,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Judge Samuel McVey
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey
presiding, on July 1, 2008 Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M.
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L Black. The Court heard
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having considered the evidence before it
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The parties in this matter were divorced on June 6, 2006.

2.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce in this case, Respondent was ordered to

pay Petitioner $1,200.00 per month alimony.
In the late spring and summer of 2007, Petitioner began staying on and off
at her parent's home in Provo. She testified that she spent nights there on
the weekends.
There is some dispute as to the number of nights Petitioner spent at her
parent's home. Some witnesses testified that Petitioner was an infrequent
guest at her parent's home. However, a private investigator, Mr.
Hunstman, testified that during the period from June 26, 2007 through
June 30, 2007, he saw the Petitioner's car at her parent's home on four of
five days, or 80% of the days he had her under surveillance. The Court
finds the most credible and persuasive evidence to be that Petitioner spent
at least 80% of her nights at her parent's home.
On the 26th of June, 2007, Mr. Hunstman saw Petitioner leave her parent's
home in the early morning in the company of a young man fitting the
description of Mike Hart. He saw her drive the young man to
Independence High School. From this evidence, the Court finds that
Petitioner and Mike Hart had contact with each other on friendly terms.
The Court also finds that Petitioner and Mike Hart probably spent at least
that night in the same house.
It is undisputed that Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents
during the late spring and summer of 2007.

7.

It is undisputed that Petitioner received mail during the spring and summer
of 2007 at her parent's home.

8.

It is undisputed that Petitioner listed her parent's home as her address on
documents she submitted to the court in. a separate criminal case.

9.

Petitioner slept on the downstairs coabli at her parent's home, often
arriving there late at night.

10.

Petitioner's parents did not charge her rent.

11.

Petitioner did not produce any credible evidence (e.g., rent receipts, bills,
etc.) to show that she was living at any other address during the spring and
summer of 2007.

12.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court is that
Petitioner's residence during the spring and summer of 2007 was her
parent's house.

13.

Petitioner was seen in a familial relationship, paired up with Mike Hart
and going together with him to events as a couple.

14.

Petitioner's parents tried to control Mike Hart and prevent any sexual
relationship involving Mike Hart. However, they were unable to control
him and prevent such contact between Mr. Hart and the Petitioner.

15.

On at least one occasion, Petitioner's son discovered his mother alone with
Mike Hart by the couch downstairs in the home of Petitioner's parents.

16.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which

the Court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike
Hart, and which is corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to
spend the night with Mike Hart in Salt Lake City.
17.

The Court believes that the most credible evidence before the Court
indicates that Petitioner and Mike Hart had a sexual relationship.

18.

Respondent has been depositing his alimony payments with the Court for
the last few months.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

Petitioner established a residence at her parent's home during the late

spring and summer of 2007.
2.

Mike Hart resided at the home of Petitioner's parents during the late

spring and summer of 2007.
3.

Petitioner and Mike Hart had a common residency.

4.

There was a sexual relationship between Petitioner and Mike Hart, which

the court infers from the common residency of the Petitioner and Mike Hart, and which is
corroborated by the evidence that Petitioner elected to spend the night with Mike Hart in
Salt Lake City.
5.

As Respondent has established a common residency between the

Petitioner and Mike Hart, the burden of proving a lack of sexual contact shifts to the
Petitioner. While Petitioner denies such contact, her actions indicate otherwise. The
Court concludes that Petitioner has not met her burden to establish lack of sexual contact.

6.

Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(10), an order for alimony in this case

terminates upon establishment by the Respondent that Petitioner is cohabitating with
another person.
7.

In this case a condition of cohabitation exists, and alimony should be

terminated effective January 31, 2008.
8.

From the funds on deposit with the Court, one-month's alimony, or

$1,200.00 should be paid to Petitioner, which will satisfy Respondent's alimony
obligation to Petitioner through January 31, 2008. The remaining balance on deposit
with the Court should be paid to Respondent.
DATED this

-

day of

^ L ^j

^

^

BY THE COURT:

2008.
,

SAMUEL MCVEY
/
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
Attorney for Petitioner

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify Imail-ed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following, this
;'_/>

day of j)

<- (

SAMUEL M. BARKER
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84017

, 2008:

,- . J "

OCT 0 6 ZHUS
4TB OtSTF?!CT
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COL'tfr"

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: 801 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673

m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BECKY SUE MYERS,
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE
OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Judge Samuel McVey
Respondent.

This matter came before the Court for trial, the Honorable Samuel McVey
presiding, on July 1, 2008. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Samuel M.
Barker. Respondent was present and represented by counsel, Guy L. Black. The Court heard
testimony, and arguments from counsel. The Court, having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS
1.

Respondent's obligation to pay Petitioner alimony is terminated in this
case, effective January 31, 2008.

2.

The clerk of the court shall pay $1,200 of the funds on deposit with the

Court in this matter to Petitioner, by making such payment payable to
Becky Sue Myers and Samuel M. Barker, and mailing such payment to
Petitioner's attorney, Samuel M. Barker.
3.

The remaining balance on deposit with the Court in this matter shall be
paid by the clerk of the court to Respondent, by making such payment
payable to Tracy Lynn Myers and Guy L. Black, and mailing such
payment to Respondent's attorney, Guy L. Black.

4.

The Decree of Divorce in this case is hereby modified, consistent with the
foregoing.

DATED this

fc

day of

0

2008.

C^O\QJU

BY THE COURT: - " - l= ''

-A

:

1

SAMUEL MCVEY
/
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

SAMUEL M. BARKER
Attorney for Petitioner

X

NOTICE

Please take notice that the undersigned will submit the above and foregoing document to the
Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of the mailing certificate
for this document, plus three (3) days for mailing unless written objection is filed prior to the
time.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify I mailed, postage prepaid, by first class mail, a
the foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE to the following, this

J ^ /

, 2008:

/

SAMUEL M. BARKER
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84017
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Legislative Research's memorandum, which legislators presumably relied on in
deciding how to proceed with the amendment, distinguished "cohabitation" from "sexual
contact," mistakenly treating them as two separate tests. For example, Legislative
Research stated, in part, under the heading "Sexual Contact and Cohabitation as Grounds
for Termination" on page 4 of the Memo: "Currently, several states terminate alimony
based on cohabitation and sexual contact with a person of the opposite sex." Addendum
C. After reading the memorandum, the average legislator could not help but assume that
cohabitation did not require sexual contact—that they were two separate and distinct
elements. In the memorandum, "cohabitating" was essentially equated with "residing,"
and "sexual contact" was a distinct factor from "cohabitating." If legislators understood
that distinction, then they arguably intended to jettison any requirement for proving
sexual contact when they removed i&Sf refukement from^ statute. The change of the
word "residing" to "cohabitating" (^gM=atee-be- easily explained as a response to General
Counsel's mistaken implication that "cohabitating" meant "residing."
Another possible explanation is that the Conference Committee recognized that
removing sexual contact as an element of cohabitation (leaving residence with another
person as the only test), as stated in the House's version of the bill, would, without some
additional test, result in alimony termination in all cases unless the payee spouse lived
alone. Surely, the legislature did not intend to terminate alimony for a payee merely
because she was living in a platonic relationship with a relative.
It seems likely that more intelligent members of the Conference Committee ri£§if

V£

recognized the problem, and being aware of Haddow 's common-law process for

Pignanelli
Smith
Tuttle

Protzman
Styler
Tyler

Seitz
Suazo
Valentine

Short
Tanner

Voting in the negative were: Representatives
Alexander
B. Allen
Bradford
Bush
Chard
R.Evans
Goodfeilow
Hendrickson
Hunter
B.Johnson
Lockman
Mortimer
01sen
N.Stephens
Ure

Bresnahan
Garn
Jensen
Murray
Wright

Absent or not voting were: Representatives
Arlington
B. Evans
Fox
M Johnson
M. Stephens
Waddoups

Haymond
Brown

S.B. 163, was signed by the Speaker in open session, in the presence of the
House, and returned to the Senate for signature of the President, enrolling and
transmission to the Governor.
*
r O M M L M C VTIONS FROM THE SENATE
Mr. Speaker:
February 28, 1995
The Senate substituted, amended, and passed, 2nd Sub H B 14
AMENDMENTS TO LOBBYIST DISCLOSURE LAW, by Representative I
Tanner, and it is transmitted for further consideration.
Annette B. Moore
Secretary of the Senate
Communication filed. On motion of Representative Tanner, the House voted
to refuse to concur with the Senate amendments to 2nd Sub. H.B. 14 and to
request the Senate to recede from its amendments.

2ND JOINT CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
Mr. Speaker:
February 28, 1995
Your Conference Committee, consisting of Senators Taylor, Hillyard, and
Money, and Representatives Haymond, Ure, and Atkinson to which was referred
H.B. 36, REVISION OF ALIMONY STANDARDS, by Representative Brent
Haymond, proposes the following amendments:
1.

Page 3, Line 17:
Goldenrod:
Remove the brackets and reinstate "and"

2.

Page 3, Line 18:
Goldenrod:
Delete ": and" and insert a period

3.

Page 3, Line 18a:
Goldenrod:
Delete line 18a

4.

Page 3, Line 18a:
Goldenrod:
After line 18a insert "(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties
in determining alimony/1

5.

Page 4, Line 7:
Goldenrod:
After "alimony" insert "or issue a new order for alimony" and delete
the remainder of line 7

6.

Page 4, Line 7a:
Goldenrod:
Delete "circumstances that justify that action"

7.

Page 4, Line 8:
Goldenrod:
After "entered" insert ". unless the court finds
circumstances that justify that action"

Mr. Speaker:
February 28, 1995
The Senate adopted the Joint Conference Committee Report dated February
28, 1995, and passed H.B. 36, REVISION OF ALIMONY STANDARDS, by
Representative J. Haymond, and it is transmitted for further consideration.
8.
Annette B. Moore
Secretary of the Senate
Communication filed.

extenuating

Page 4, Line 17:
Goldenrod:
After "unless" delete "at the time the alimony is scheduled to end" and
insert ". at any time prior to termination of alimony."

9.

Page 4a, Line 27a:
Goldenrod:
After line 27a insert:
"Section 2. Legislative Intent.
It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based
on cohabitation with another person in accordance with Subsection
30-3-5(9). be interpreted in any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose."

Absent or not voting were: Representatives
Alexander
Davis
Ellertson
Hatch
Matthews
Smith
Tuttle

Garn
M. Stephens

H.B. 36, as amended by the Joint Conference Committee, transmitted to the
Senate for signature of the President.
MISCELLANEOUS BUSINESS

Senator Craig Taylor
Senate Chair
Representative Brent Haymond
House Chair
Communication filed. On motion of Representative Haymond, the House
voted to adopt the Joint Conference Committee Report to H.B. 36.
H.B. 36, as amended by the Joint Conference Committee, then passed on the
following roll call:

On motion of Representative Adair, under suspension of the rules, the House
voted to reconsider its action on S.B. 173.
RECONSIDERATION OF S.B. 173
S.B. 173, UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT - AMENDMENTS, was
before the House on its reconsideration.
On motion of Representative Adair, the bill was amended as follows:
1.

Page 2, Line 2:
Delete "or fetus"

Yeas, 66; Nays, 0; Absent or not voting, 9.
S.B. 173, as amended, then passed on the following roll call:
Voting in the affirmative were: Representatives
Adair
B. Allen
S. Allen
Arlington
Atkinson
Baca
Bigelow
Bodily
Bowman
Bradshaw
Bresnahan
Buffmire
Carlson
Carnahan
Chard
Dillree
B. Evans
R Evans
Frandsen
Goodfellow
Gowans
Harward
Haymond
Hendrickson
Holladay
Hunsaker
Hunter
B.Johnson
K. Johnson
M. Johnson
Killpack
Knudson
Larson
Moran
Mortimer
Murray
Nielsen
Olsen
Oscarson
Pignanelli
Protzman
Seitz
N Stephens
Styler
Suazo
Urc
Valentine
Tyler
Wright
Brown

Yeas, 73; Nays, 1; Absent or not voting, 1.
Anderson
Barth
Bradford
Bush
Curtis
Fox
Gublcr
Hickman
Jensen
Jones
Lockman
Nelson
Peterson
Short
Tanner
Waddoups

Voting in the affirmative were:;Representatives
Adair
Alexander
B. Allen
Anderson
Arlington
Atkinson
Bigelow
Bowman
Bodily
Bradshaw
Bresnahan
Buffmire
Carlson
Carnahan
Chard
Davis
Dillree
Ellertson
R. Evans
Frandsen
Fox
Goodfellow
Gowans
Gubler
Hendrickson
Hatch
Haymond
Hunter
Holladay
Hunsaker
B. Johnson
K. Johnson
M. Johnson
Killpack
Knudson
Larson
Moran
Murray
Mortimer
Oscarson
Nielsen
Olsen
Seitz
Pignanelli
Protzman
Smith
N. Stephens
M. Stephens

S. Allen
Barth
Bradford
Bush
Curtis
B. Evans
Gam
Harward
Hickman
Jensen
Jones
Matthews
Nelson
Peterson
Short
Styler
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COMMUNICATIONS FROM THL HOL sL
lr President
February 28,1995^
The House passed as amended, H.B 345 CREATION OF UTAH STATE•£
1
MR CORPORATION, by Representative K Smith, and it is transmitted for^
msideration, and

ADay44

^
A

3

Page , Line 18a (goldenrod copy)
Delete line 18a

4

Page 3, Line 18a (goldenrod copy)
After line 18a insert

869

"(b) The court mav consider the fault of the parties in determining

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 344, APPROPRIATION FOR1*
CLASSROOM SUPPLIES, by Representative R Bigelow, et al and it is'
transmitted for consideration, and

alimony/'
Renumber remaining subsections accordingly

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 185, CRIME INVOLVING AWEAPON, by Representative D Bresnahan, and it is transmitted tor
consideration, and

Page 4, Line 7 (goldenrod copy)

After "alimony" insert "or issue a new order for alimony" and delete
the remainder of line 7
Page 4, Line 7a (goldenrod copy)

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 450 AMENDMENTS TO COUNTY
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING, b\ Representative R Short, and it is ^
ransrrutted for consideration, and
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 418 DISPLACED DEFENSE,
WORKERS ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY AMENDMENTS by
Representative G Protzman, and it is transmitted for consideration, and

SENATE JOURNAL

Delete "circumstances that justify that actior.
2l 7. Page 4, Line 8 (goldenrod copy)
Atter "entered" insert ". unless

iht

tc i

finds

extenuating

circumstances that justify that action"

The House passed, as amended H.B. 304, USED TIRE MANAGEMENT
AMENDMENTS, by Representatnt D Ure, and it is transmitted tor
consideration
*

8

Page 4, Line 17 (goldenrod copy)
After "unless" delete "at the time the alimony is scheduled to end" and

Carole E Peterson, Chief Clerk%
Communication filed H.B. 343, H.B. 344, H.B. 185, H.B. 450, H.B. 418^;
and H.B. 304, were read the first time and referred to the President oi the Senate /

9. Page 4a, Line 27a (goldenrod copy)
After line 27a insert

insert", at any time poor to termination of alimony/'

"Section 2, Legislative Intent,
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
Mr President
February 28, 1995
Your conference Committee, consisting of Senators Taylor, Hillyard, and
Money, and Representatives Haymond, Ure, and Atkinson who which wa$
referred H.B. 36, Revision of Alimony Standards, by Rep Brent Haymond
proposes the following amendments
1

Page 3, Line 17 (goldenrod copy)
Remove the brackets and reinstate "and'

2

Page 3, Line 18 (goldenrod copy)
Delete *. and and insert a period

It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based
on cohabitation with another person in accordance with Subsection
30-3-5(9). be interpreted in any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose,"
Craig Taylor, Senate Chair
Brent Haymond, House Chair
Report filed On motion of Senator Taylor, the Senate voted to adopt the
Conference Committee Repor1 H.B. 36 passed on the following roll call
leas, 24; Nays, 0; Absent, 5.
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Voting in the affirmative were: Senators
Black
Blackham
Dmitrich
Holmgren
Hull
Mansell
Mayne
McAllister
Money
Myrin
C Peterson
M. Peterson
Richards
Steele
Steiner
Stewart
Tanner
Taylor
Absent were: Senators
Buhler
Howell
Wharton

Poulton
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Hillyard
Mantes
Montgomery
Rees
Stephenson
Beattie
Watson

SECOND READING CALENDAR
On motion of Senator Holmgren, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 138,
WATER AND IRRIGATION - CRITERIA FOR SMALL AMOUNT
APPLICATIONS, was read the second and third times.
Mr. President:
February 20,1995
The Energy, Natural Resources, and Agriculture Committee reports a
favorable recommendation on H.B. 138, WATER AND IRRIGATION CRITERIA FOR SMALL AMOUNT APPLICATIONS, by Representative ML
Styler.
Alarik Myrin
Committee Chair
Committee report read and adopted. Senator Holmgren explained the bill
The bill passed on the following roll call:
Yeas, 27; Nays, 0; Absent, 2.

Buhler
Hull
McAllister
C. Peterson
Richards
Stewart
Beattie
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On motion of Senator Hillyard, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 159,
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, was
read the second and third times.
Mr. President:
February 20, 1995
The Judiciary Committee reports a favorable recommendation on H.B. 159,
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, by
Representative R. Ellertson.

Yeas, 28; Nays, 0; Absent, 1.
Voting in the affirmative were: Senators
Black
Blackham
Buhler
Hillyard
Holmgren
Hull
Mantes
Mayne
McAllister
Montgomery
Myrin
C. Peterson
Poulton
Rees
Richards
Steiner
Stephenson
Stewart
Taylor
Watson
Wharton

Dmitrich
Mansell
Money
M. Peterson
Steele
Tanner
Beattie

Absent was: Senator
Howell
H.B. 159 was signed by the President of the Senate in open session and
returned to the House.

Voting in the affirmative were: Senators

Blackham
Holmgren
Mayne
Myrin
Rees
Stephenson
Wharton

SENATE JOURNAL

Craig L. Taylor
Committee Chair
Committee report read and adopted. Senator Hillyard explained the bill. The
bill passed on the following roll call:

H.B. 36 was transmitted to the House

Black
Hillyard
Mantes
Montgomery
Poulton
Steiner
Taylor

' Day 44

Dmitrich
Mansell
Money
M. Peterson
Steele
Tanner

Absent were: Senators
Howell
Watson
H.B. 138 was signed by the President of the Senate in open session and
returned to the House.

?r On motion of Senator Steele, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 31, PUBLIC
SCHOOL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS, was read the second and third times.
. Mr. President:
February 20, 1995
The Transportation and Public Safety Committee reports a favorable
recommendation on
H.B. 31, PUBLIC SCHOOL RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENTS, by Representative M. Dillree.
David H. Steele
Committee Chair
Committee report read and adopted. Senator Steele explained the bill.
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TWs toemorsnduni briefly dismisses alimony award* in the IMurd Siirt£S And
{ttrtktibriy 113 Utah, &fem spedfinilly il addresses IWO quesiioas coaasejintlisg alimony: finfl,
wfcu arc ihc MsioriOL! purposes for awarding alimony, find do Awards offclinsoHYIn Uiab
follow sh&se purposes; aod sesood* wbeu is it agpropii&ie to ttrmimfc alimony awards based
Oft cohabitttkm sud sexual cooiact UnforamirteJy, due 10 the timlted time avsQ&ide rftar Iks
recent Leghiative Special Session, our research £as been oecBSsarily &sited.
EL

HISTORICAL INTENT IN AWARDING ALIMONY
A.

f^irjwes of Alimony in the United Stales*
L

Alftnwiy asfodctefflft*.Nop-Absolute Divorce in fopland

As whh many early niks of Aiwricafi law, ih& £OJ*e£pit of granuag alimony ioc&eot
to divotct was imparted from Eflgteal prior ta ilie iefano of jhe English oo&rt system m
I85?t &*s English &de»tttfk&! cows Awarded alimony in crojiuttkus wife a dhwrct a

4

&& Hotter K O a k Jfc.33fe^SE^
C2d«L 1987).

tfff.lfctoftSttBS

4»Sn^O#ttrf * &kIjfeaty,tMiMm * *#m3&-i0&

220-24

$*tn$o m jtar* * Thk type of tilvom wibmte&A husband *»# wife la Hve separately,featdid
t*m fac ttcm faa& the marriage towk Tte award ^ alimony was ttaply t idtectiofc of tfee
femhwJ'i tmiiiiiiitig marital doty 10 msppott &c wife, tlift wifc*i isaed for impart wa* pm
in 19th «seutmyfisygiaadbaam& of jfee coritroj war pr$pmy jjivta tci &e tebaad, and ike
ttai&d utiaabet $f toptoyiaeai oppcattoto ifor w<rae&, itowwer, whea alkaooy was
Ewanfcd in Ste United Slates it was pvtn in cooiicciion with ihsolu^ divorce, obscuring ihe
bmcdcaJ {Eposes of Jtaooy itwank

Shmz t&lo&lai HmtAt, alimony im h&m awarded te the Itei&d Sffln to ccmjuMciou
wjife absolute «Jivampe„ The authority 10 gram alimony is m a i t a y ** &&&&&• Abhm$h ntaify
all toles have stamtes providing for alimony* there is a lack of &%n'&mwt between sMote,
legal acfaolart, mi cogrts as ID the impropriate piitrposes of aliases feme see iZi&ooy as a
contiouaiicm of the support lhat a spoti&£ was jt&tttkd to xecdvc whik ihe marriage exis^d,
others telteys that «Umony serves to provide dfiift&g&s for d?£ wrongful breach of the
marrkgt comract, whik oilers are of the opiaioo thai alimony jserra as a pea&fay fat the
ItecMag apoajus* Cfcjier fusctiofs often refeiral to juidude support for the taswdkn of lbs
children of Lhs ouwriafe, eo#?peH$aifcm ftsf service provided daring ibe uumrMfe or
0ppamini&& foregone, wfiik o&ea arjm that ii serves no useful ftmciioti whatever. It is
afeoOTj&DH&nttD note thai ibc United Static Supnime Coast has bald that sia&s&s imposing
atiia&ay *mly on hiishand*fcftdin fsvor of wives vioiaies Ifee equ^l p^oDecuoo cl^Bc of she
Hailed Sinto Consiimii0n.J Tfetis* alimony ahotiid te availabte i<s eiithci: spouse, i i m t o
<^bscurfei| ?hc historical purposes <sf sliiDcaiy,

^*

jfaffira Uraf In. AwcjBng Alimony

Oi-v^ai i&£ ladt of mnsetLOT? tsn A JC^OTHI «ocW policj*fcelitodjdimwy, r t e t exfes a
wicte variety of JputiScaiiGiss for iwardiftj^ afimo&y,, provided by siskin and ease kw lo be
a$ed a ^stemiimng wteiter aJlmi?ny 13 appjt^naie lo a given c&se. The Mowing i& a S?*L of
The m&st cooinioD jtasiillcatiD^ qse-d in wardhg almjncy:

a

Alixsofiy was also given in conjuaclloa wi& ihc PadianjiKiii^ry divcircerSbe only
alxsotute divorce avtuialnte in EhglatKl at lhat ttme, However, scholars have concluded to si
was i&s esoc^i^siieai law ikat kllusaced Amcncan kw Jggy.g.g,. Komef H. O&rit, Ix.t The
Law of Dowiestic Hel^rio^ In dte U.oted S^tgs 220, 221 {2d cd, 1937); Vtimer md Hi/Abut*
IMKtmpc^
Bzdk£tmmi of .Athaa^y U_w..and its ftresent S^atotwv SmiciOT, 6 Law A
Co^!«mp, Prohs, 197 (1939).
1

ftEv,,<ta,440 DA m ami

/

iBS^feffeam ffif A P W AWfa

*t

Dtoetim of the trial court
The defemkflt's ability 10 pay,
* Heeds,
for j^iMStaitvft, at i&cnt-iwa, alimony*
'uraaueat for coi&ibiiiloa lo the edaaiiimi* ittink& & j*tsfe$$it»ial
of the oih^r spouse,
fkult «f the parties^
;efendbeattb ttf tie fwurtic^

uraLioo of niirrkgf,
tenfold of living wilhln the msmage; mi
Chtar dwacta,is&& sach as financial obBgatSo&s tad pstm&fiifil property.
Whclbcr these factors or justifimton* are welded *ud evaluated m any pmkulm
varies greatly from $$&& to state.4
B.

cm

Pujposes of Altroonj In Utah5

in Utah* tra! cowrts would appear tofeavebroad discretion in awarding ilimoay
fcecaosae the proc&e&ng is equitable in nature,* However* s e m i l comiao&Jy ti&d porposes
mt ofieo ghfeo. fim, t& enable da recdying spmuwe la nurfniim, *$ nearly *$ pasdbto, the
Stodani «tf living enjoyed during &2 maniap; seconds to jntvtm &e spoost item becoming
& public C&arge;fc&dfisfedLto &|ti*lifie tbe parites* standard of living Tbe$e purposes lead fco
ibra? factors «$e?d by ifce Uiafe wuns, known JBS *JooesH factors, io deienslne $ reasonable
^HnKHiy award"fiist*the ftBaodai conditions snd needs of the ig&eivinjg spoose; ^second* die
stoCiify of #*e receiving spouse $a prodiKe » syffieie&t incai^; mdftSfd,ti&jf&fy of the
Sspparfisi; spaasfc 10 provide jRippajt*

4

For a mmmBFf of tally kw m ibe stales jgat Timothy B* Walter. ffemly Lqw In foe
fifty States: An Overview. 26 F&m. L. Q, 322-420 (i9#3>,
5

& £ BXU. X Legal SauL, Summary of Utah Family law ft 33J to 13,$J 0980)-

* Ui*h Code Ana 1 3 0 - M (Supp- 1993); Johnson v,. Johnson. 855 ?2d 250,251 (UuA
App I993X
?

Ro^rtgy>, Roberts. 835 POd 193. 19$ (Uteh App, 19»Xgtjnq Moans v. Mganji 790
P,2d 116. 121 (Utah App, I990)X

* totals y, tataa, *3S pjd m* m mm App. mzy^nt fa» ?, RB«.?OP
R3d 1072,1075flJi^fe!9S5^

C

Summary; life* Iftirpwt tf AXkmtof

Tb& jm*pa$ei <rf ritaoay fa Utah, Wx tht |»nt|>aBes of illmcmy t^oawkJe* seetti 10
h m been developed from teioxtaal amkijra of minings ami famfly &a* iuwe b&tn t&pi&y
<tfmifa& Some gchaka irgafc &kt atlmcaiy *&» hm#er mvm my Useful faaolaa* wb&re
®&im xtpw &a* h operate m pmpesty protect Mid caapcagite ®patim ai «te teratafttioii of
jasmagt, ft is difficult m sty w t e t o Utah kw follow tn*dkjcmjri pwposes for alimony due
m cofiflkts in defining #& frad&iottal purposes of fclimoay, Furthermost «ft# 00 rapkl «ochl
m& economic s t e g e ft ii tmttear wt&ttar tmdifcntl purposes Should itiB be cantered
fcpprapriatt. It may be thai the scasimta&e will wist* 10 further m&y U t f l Cftttictt policy 01?
iriiiaofly $0 &temdj3e wfte&er it *mm tte proper and desirttf punp^e.

ill

TERMINATION OF ALIMONY
A,

Seacual Contact find CoimbJtoifcli m Gtmn8& ft*r Termination
*•

Heterosexual contact

Aimo-j&t all g&szs ttrmmmz altoKmy tipoa the ^marriage ot Lbe jfedpfeaL However,
*& coh^itatioa became man? j?rtva!e&i #vcr time sad &e nsed «rose fof cahabittatfoa 4$ be
ieoo{ni2Cd as a iu&» 10 which legalfriinfens-smd bt#cJIt& &*ml& acotie, smites began ta
permit the femsinsiiou of Simony ptyme&is iofcohabiiaiian£taatiai$& AishougJj these
£&t9t£S have JK& b^en wiMy cfeatftenged ao ^ast&atiocuiJ gfOTflds* w!>£3 dfcdkiifes tsave
grisen 6 s stasuiESL have been uitteld a n t e eq^ti p&icttta&« due paxe&t and privacy
smlyses* Oir^ntly, &&yeal states tafnsuuc Jdimanyfc&setfon ccto&*rii0& &&# sextft!
oomtaci with A petr^tt of lfae spposise £&JLW

No €&s£ has mtn found address!^ lte few of &e co*i$toi0&aHry of hom&s^xiu&I
sexual contact lemiiiuuifl^ alimony.14 Although tb& issrituticn of ibis issue fe usKkar due to
9

gqfc.feJL Rctens v. Roberts, 657 P.2d 153 {OU, IS83); in re Marna^2e tf Edwarcb,
698 R2d 542 (Or. App 1985): Shns v. Sim&. 253 S i 2 d 762 {GaL 1W9).
35

J&& Txni0ii>y B+ Writer. Family b w in fey Bftv Slate: An Omvipw. 26 F ^ B , t , Q36^367 (I9»).
11

H^y&» Cmty & Deanis CBffora, A UtAQw^k

faJtis^.mMJMSfflBfc*

W*

etf, JS$i) efioe co iftw cises irii&ii fwpjiteifly Imve pennltetf modiffiyca&jt or lenntodiM «f
t&acny pEyin«iitss %me& 0H 3t»om-oi!sai»i2 JicSvity, HOVWJV^PI* Ms Mmms^m hm been

4

the absence of case law, it appears that an amendment to Utah's alimony provisions removing
the "opposite sex" requirement for terminating alimony based on cohabitation may be
constitutionally permissible. On its face, this amendment would apply equally to all persons,
because it would remove the sexual orientation barrier formerly imposed in alimony
situations.
If the amended statute was challenged on equal protection grounds, a court would
probably apply either a mid-tier or a strict scrutiny test Courts would be unlikely to apply a
"meie rationality" test because this test has traditionally been reserved for economic issues.12
However, if a court did decide to apply a "mere rationality* level of scrutiny in this case, the
statute would almost certainly be upheld because courts are extremely deferential to
legislative intent under this standanl13 If, however, tbe court determines that sexual
orientation is a "suspect class", the court may apply a strict scrutiny standard.14 If the court
applies strict scrutiny, the statute would likely be stricken unless it is necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest15 to practice, strict scrutiny almost always leads to a
finding of unconstitutionality.16 Finally, if the court decided to apply mid~tier scrutiny, a test
traditionally reserved for cases involving classification based on gender and illegitimacy,17 the
result would be unclear. Under mid-tier scrutiny, the court assesses whether the means

unverifiable because the authors did not provide citations to these cases. Additionally, the
statutory schemes under which these cases were decided may have changed, and the authors
were not contacted.
n

See Lindslev v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co». 220 U.S. 61 (1911).

14

The U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized sexual orientation as a suspect class and
declined to rule on this issue in Bowers v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). However, in the
recent Hawaii Supreme Court case, Baehr v. Lewin. 852 P.2d 44 (Hawaii 1993), the court
held that Hawaii's statute restricting marriages to male and female partnerships establishes a
sex-based classification which is subject to strict judicial scrutiny under an equal protection
analysis of the state's constitutional civil rights provisions. Although Hawaii determined that
sex or gender based classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, the United States Supreme
Court has afforded only mid-tier scrutiny to such classifications.
15

See Citv of Richmond v. J.A. Croson. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).

16

j § ^ Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Eouaf Protection. 86 Harv. L Rev. 8
(1972).
17

Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law (3rd e& 1986).

5

chosen by the legislature serves important governmental objectives and whether the legislation
is substantially related to achieving those objectives.18
Legislators and policymakers should be aware that while it may be constitutional to
amend Utah's statute to remove the sexual orientation barrier, this legislative change could
provide an argument in litigation to gay or lesbian plaintiffs that a recognition of their
relationship has been established by inference and could be asserted to apply in other
contexts. The merits of this argument and the likelihood of its assertion remains unexplored-

V.

CONCLUSION

The laws of the various $me$ regarding alimony are diverse and rapidly changing.
Because the historical purposes of alimony are unclear, modern jurisdictions currently diverge
in their interpretations of alimony policy. These purposes have been further obscured by
changing familial, economic, and social relationships. The committee may wish to reevaluate
the role, scope, and purposes of alimony in light of these changing relationships.
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Page , Line 18a (goldenrod copy)
Delete line 18a

Mr President
February 28 1995
The House passed, as amended, H.B. 343, CREATION OF UTAH STATE
FAIR CORPORATION, by Representative K Smith, and it is transmitted for
consideration, and

J

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 344, APPROPRIATION FOR
CLASSROOM SUPPLIES, by Representative R Bigelow, et al, and it is
transmitted for consideration, and

10

Page 3, Line 18a (goldenrod copy)
After line 18a insert
"(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining
alimony,"
Renumber remaining subsections accordingly

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 185, CRIME INVOLVING A
WEAPON, by Representative D Bresnahan, and it is transmitted for
consideration, and

5

Page 4, Line 7 (goldenrod copy)
After "alimony" insert "or issue a new order for alimony77 and delete
the remainder of line 7

>4

6

Page 4, Line 7a (goldenrod copy)
Delete "circumstances that justify that action"

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 418 DISPLACED DEFENSE **j
WORKERS ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY AMENDMENTS, by
Representative G Protzman, and it is transmitted tor consideration, and

7

Page 4, Line 8 (goldenrod copy)
After "entered" insert ". unless the court
circumstances that justify that action"

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 304 USED TIRE MANAGEMENT
AMENDMENTS, by Representative D Ure, and it is transmitted tor
consideration

8

Page 4, Line 17 (goldenrod copy)
After "unless77 delete "at the time the ahmonv is scheduled to end77 and
msen , at any time pnor to termination of alimony,"

Caiole E Peterson, Chief Clerk
Communication filed H.B. 343, H.B. 344, H.B. 185, H.B. 450, H.B. 418,
and H.B. 304, were read the first time and referred to the President of the Senate

9

Page 4a, Line 27a (goldenrod copy)
After line 27a insert

The House passed, as amended, H.B. 450 AMENDMENTS TO COUNTY
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING, by Representative R Short, and it is
transmitted for consideration, and

finds

extenuating

"Section 2. Legislative Intent.
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT
It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of alimony based
on cohabitation with another person in accordance with Subsection
30-3-5(9). be interpreted in any way to condone such a relationship for
any purpose "

Mr President
February 28, 199S
Your conference Committee, consisting of Senators Taylor Hillyard, and
Money, and Representatives Haymond, Ure, and Atkinson who which was ^J
relerred H.B. 36, Revision ol Alimony Standards by Rep Brent Haymond,
proposes the following amendments
1

Page 3, Line 17 (goldenrod copy)
Remove the brackets and leinstate and

2

Page \ Line 18 (goldenrod copy)
Delete ". and ' and insert a penod

Craig Taylor, Senate Chair

4

Brent Haymond, House Chair
Report filed On motion of Senator Taylor, the Senate voted to adopt the
Conference Committee Report H.B. 36 passed on the following roll call

•Veas,24:Navs ft- Ahc<>«f *
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Voting in the affirmative were: Senators
Black
Blackham
Dmitrich
Holmgren
Hull
Mansell
Mayne
McAllister
Money
Myrin
C Peterson
M Peterson
Richards
Steele
Sterner
Stewart
Tanner
Taylor
Absent were: Senators
Buhler
Howell
Wharton
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Hillyard
Mantes
Montgomery
Rees
Stephenson
Beattie
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i
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Watson
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On motion of Senator Hillyard, under suspension of the rules H.B. 159
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, was
read the second and third times
Mr President
February 20, 1995
The Judiciary Committee reports a favorable recommendation on H.B. 159,
UNIFORMITY OF PENALTY STRUCTURE ON CRIMINAL OFFENSES, by
Representative R Ellertson
Craig L Taylor
Committee Chair
Committee report read and adopted Senator Hillyard explained the bill The
» bill passed on the following roll call

H.B. 36 was transmitted to the House
SECOND READING CALENDAR

On motion of Senator Holmgren, under suspension of the rules, H.B, 138,
Yeas, 28; Nays, 0; Absent, 1.
WATER AND IRRIGATION - CRITERIA FOR SMALL AMOUNT
APPLICATIONS, was read the second and third times
\W) Voting in the affirmative were: Senators
Buhler
Blackham
Mr President
February 20,1995 3r< Black
Hull
rA^Hillyard
Holmgren
The Energy, Natural Resources, and Agiiculture Committee reports a
McAllister
|*f
Mantes
Mayne
favorable recommendation on H.B 138, WATER AND IRRIGATION C Peterson
Montgomery
Myrin
CRITERIA FOR SMALL AMOUNT APPLICATIONS, by Representative M
Richards
>3M
Poulton
Rees
Styler.
Stewart
Stephenson
Sterner
Alaiik Myrin
Wharton
Watson
Taylor
Committee Chair
Committee report read and adopted Senator Holmgren explained the bill
Absent was: Senator
The bill passed on the following roll call
Howell

Dmitnch
Mansell
Money
M Peterson
Steele
Tanner
Beattie

H.B. 159 was signed by the President of the Senate in open session and
returned to the House

Yeas, 27; Nays, 0; Absent, 2.
Voting in the affirmative were: Senators
Black
Blackham
Buhler
Hull
Holmgren
Hillyard
Mayne
McAllister
Mantes
C Peterson
Myrin
Montgomery
Richards
Rees
Poulton
Stewart
Stephenson
Sterner
Wharton
Beattie
Taylor

871

Dmitrich
Mansell
Money
M Peterson
Steele
Tanner

Absent v* ere: Senators
Watson
Howell
H.B 138 was signed by the President ol the Senate in open session and
returned to the House

»

*i
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On motion of Senator Steele, under suspension of the rules, H.B. 31, PUBLIC
SCHOOL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS, was read the second and third times
Mr President
February 20, 1995
The Transportation and Public Safety Committee reports a favorable
recommendation on
H.B. 31, PUBLIC SCHOOL RESIDENCY
, REQUIREMENTS, by Representative M Dillree
,
•'

David H Steele
Committee Chair
Committee report read and adopted Senator Steele explained the bill
Senator S t P n h * » n c r \ n
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ADDENDUM E
AFFIDAVIT OF MISTY MYERS

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone. (801)377-4652
Facsimile-(801) 377-4673

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BECKY SUE MYERS,
AFFIDAVIT OF MISTY MYERS
Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent.

STATE OF
COUNTY OF

ss.
)

MISTY MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the adult daughter of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit.

DEFENDANT'S^
E X H I B I T W V - - 'Sir

<•'

My mother, Becky Sue Myers, had an ongoing, romantic relationship with a
foster-care boy, Mike, while both of them lived at my grandmother's home
from about April, 2007 through August, 2007.
My mother had been living at my grandmother's home beginning in about
April, 2006.
In about April, 2007, Mike moved into the home as my grandmother's
foster-care child. He resided there until he was removed from the home and
my grandmother's license to care for foster children was removed in August,
2007.
From April through the present, Mike and my mother have been inseparable.
They have been and are always together whenever I see them.
In May, 2007, my mom picked my upon from Smith's in Orem, Utah. When
she got there, she told me that she had to pick up the boys (my
grandmother's foster boys). When she stopped to pick up the boys, she told
me I had to get in the back so Mike could ride up front with her. I thought
her behavior odd. Her interaction with Mike on that trip caused me to
believe that she had a romantic interest in him.
At the end of May, 2007, my sister, Lacy, had a birthday party for my niece
and nephew at a park in Provo. The party was just a family party. As my
mom was part of the family, she was invited to go to the party. She and
2

Mike arrived together and were together throughout the party, sitting side by
side, and treating each other as though they were boyfriend and girlfriend.
They left together. I thought it was strange how my mom was acting around
Mike.
9.

In August, 2007,1 helped my sister move. She had things in a storage unit
that she shared with my mom, so we went there to get her stuff

10.

While I was at the storage unit, I noticed letters sitting on top of a stroller,
addressed to Becky from Mike. When I later asked my Mom about the
letters, she appeared embarrassed and defensive. I asked her what was going
on between her and Mike. She told me it was none of my business. I asked
her if she knew what would happen if they got caught together. She told me
she knew what would happen. From that conversation, it was clear to me
that my mother was having a romantic relationship with Mike.

11.

Several times during the months my mom and Mike lived with my
grandmother, when I went to visit I was told that my mom was not home,
and she had gone out with Mike, just the two of them (which was against
Y.H.A. rules for the foster care.

12.

Also, she would sometimes visit me at my apartment or my sister's house.
She was always with Mike and not the other foster boys.

3

13.

I recently learned that my mom and Mike are continuing to see each other,
even after Mike was removed from the home and transferred to a new place
in Salt Lake City.

DATED this

aoih

day of _

DebfoaqJ

, 2008.

MISTY MYERS^
Affiant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s ^ ^ day of \ '-PJArUCL ^V
2008 by MISTY MYERS.

,

ADDENDUM F
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYCE MYERS
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r;..i^ i ,

I

'

^ . , ,

GUY L. BLACK, No. 6182
GREENWOOD & BLACK
Attorneys for Respondent
1840 North State Street, Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 377-4652
Facsimile: (801) 377-4673

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BECKY SUE MYERS,
AFFIDAVIT OF BRYCE MYERS
Petitioner,
vs.

Civil No. 064400347
TRACY LYNN MYERS,
Respondent.

STATE OF

)
ss:

COUNTY OF.

)

BRYCE MYERS, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the adult son of Petitioner and Respondent in this matter.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and if called upon to
testify, I would testify in accordance with this affidavit.

3.

I do not have any doubt that my mother, Becky Sue Myers, was having a
sexual relationship with Mike, a foster boy, during the time both of them
lived with my grandmother, from about May through August, 2007.

Mike often spoke about Mom to me when he and I hung out together. He
spoke of her as his girlfriend. I saw them flirting with each other all the
time. They also slept in the same room together, although they tried to hide
the fact that they were sleeping together. Mom would go downstairs and
sleep on the couch instead of sleeping in her room. Mike would go
downstairs too. I caught him "sleeping55 on the floor next to the couch,
while my mother was "sleeping" on the couch.
Sometime during May, 2007, Mike came to me crying because he had a
fight with Mom, because they were having a rocky time in their relationship.
He told me that he understood why Dad left Mom. He acted like a heartbroken, love-sick boy.
Sometime near the Fourth of July, 2007, my mom called me while Mike and
I were at my friend's house. She flew into a jealous rage over the phone,
because she thought Mike was hanging out with girls. She told me she was
done with him because he was cheating on her.
On several other occasions, the same jealous behavior happened. She had to
be with Mike all the time, or she became jealous. My mom was always
calling me when I was hanging out with Mike. She was always freaked out
claiming that he was with some other girl, instead of with her.
Sometime around August, Mike came to me and told me that he had gotten
into a fight again with my mom. He told me he had punched out the window
2

of her car because he was upset that he had found a crack cocaine pipe in her
purse. It is common knowledge that my mom has had a drug problem.
>.

After Mike was removed from my grandparent's home, after their fostercare license was revoked, Mike was moved up to Salt Lake. My mom came
to me sometime shortly after the move and asked if she could take my car to
Salt Lake to see Mike because her car wouldn't make the trip. I called my
Mom the next morning because I needed my car to get to work. She told me
she had just left Mike's house and was on her way back.

DATED this Q^j

day of FfjRUi

fifty

, 2008.

M Y ^ E MYERS /
Affiant

^rS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this^-l^day of f-^JbruUa;r v
2008 by BRYCE MYERS.

J^Q^^UBLIC

4b*4bdbrtfk*fe«4hM4briflb4bM4fctffltarffe#

DAVID BBC WJCH*H*H
Notary Public
^
State of Wah
f
MyComm Expires Oct! 1,201 Or
1012 W80Q S P^jscn UTe4651 -2603f
*F W W ir m m v m m

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 1 H day of October, 2010,1 hand delivered two
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Samuel M. Barker and Jeffrey A.
Callister, attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant, at the following address, together with a pdf
copy on CD:
Samuel M. Barker
Jeffrey A. Callister
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200
Murray, Utah 84107

